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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
May 27, 1982 Conference
List 1, Sheet 4
No. 81-1859

Cert to Ill App Ct (Heiple,
Scott, Alloy)

ILLINOIS

v.
LAFAYETTE
State/Criminal
1.

SUMMARY.

Timely

May the police search a purse without a warrant

after the owner has been arrested and transported to the station

---

house?

2.

FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW.

Police arrested resp for disturb-

ing the peace and took him to the station house.

At the time of

arrest, resp was wearing a purse over his shoulder.

Police searched

-

side a cigarette package.

2 -

Resp was charged with possession of a

controlled substance and moved to suppress the amphetamines.

At the

suppression hearing, the officer who searched the purse testified
that he had no fear for his safety when he arrested resp and that he
did not expect to find a gun or drugs when he searched the purse.
Instead, he conducted the search because standard procedures require
the police to inventory everything possessed by an arrestee.

The

officer admitted that resp's purse was small enough to be sealed in
a bag or box for protective purposes.
The trial court suppressed the evidence and the Ill App Ct affirmed.

The State could not defend the search as a search incident

to arrest, because it had not made this argument at the suppression
hearing.

Even if the State had not waived the point, a stationhouse

search of a closed container cannot be a search incident to arrest.
See United States v. Chadwick, 433

u.s.

1 (1977)

(Government could

not justify stationhouse search of locked footlocker, seized at time
of arrest, as a search incident to arrest).
The Ill Ct App then concluded that petr's search of the purse
was not a valid inventory search.

In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428

upheld the inventory search of an automobile.

Illinois, however, has refused to apply Opperman to closed

personal containers, because these enjoy greater privacy interests
than automobiles and because the police may secure containers of
this sort simply by sealing them in a bag or box.
82 Ill. 2d 128, 411 N.E.2d 1346 (1980).

People v. Bayles,

In this case, moreover, the

arresting officer testified that he had no fear for his safety.
The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.

I

- 3 -

3.

CONTENTIONS.

dent to arrest.

(1) The search was a reasonable search inci-

Chadwick is distinguishable because it involved a

locked footlocker.

The purse involved here was much more intimately

associated with resp's person.
States v. Edwards, 415

u.s.

As the Court recognized in United

800, 803 (1974), "searches and seizures

that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be
conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention."
Applying this principle, several courts have upheld stationhouse
searches of wallets and purses.

United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d

938 (CA9 1980); United States v. Phillips, 607 F.2d 808 (CAS 1979);
Sumlin v. State, 587 S.W.2d 571 (Ark. 1979).
(2) The search was also a valid inventory search.

As the Court

recognized in Opperman, these searches protect the owner's property
while it remains in police custody, protect the police against disputes over lost and stolen property, and save the police from potential danger.

Applying this reasoning, several courts have approved

inventory searches of purses.
(Cal. 1976)

E.g., People v. Maher, 550 P.2d 1044

(dictum); People v. Harris, 105 Cal. App. 3d 204 (1st

Dist. 1980); Sumlin v. State, supra.
4.

DISCUSSION.

The Ill Ct App expressly referred to the

Fourth Amendment and relied upon cases construing that provision.
People v. Bayles, the Illinois case that the court followed, also
rested explicitly on the Fourth Amendment.

Thus, there is no doubt

that the court invoked the federal Constitution to strike the search
contested here.
As petr points out, the lower court's holding conflicts with
several other decisions.

Even some of those conflicting decisions,

- 4 -

moreover, expressed uncertainty about the effect of Chadwick on
stationhouse searches.

The Court, therefore, might want to call for

a response and consider clarifying the bounds of stationhouse
searches.
On the other hand, this probably would be a poor case for that
task.

Although the lower court discussed the "search incident to

arrest" exception at length, it rejected that rationale on the basis
of the State's waiver. 1

This Court, accordingly, could only review

the inventory search argument, which the state court rejected on the
merits.

It might be better to review the constitutionality of

stationhouse searches in a case in which both the inventory and
"search incident" rationales would be available to the Court.
There is no response.
May 18, 1982

op in petn

Merritt

1 The court wrote: "we find the State has waived this argument
for the purposes of appeal by failing to raise it at the
suppression hearing ..•. Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that
the State has not waived this argument, the stationhouse search
of the shoulder bag did not constitute a valid search incident to
a lawful arrest." Petn app 3a. The court then discussed the
merits of the State's argument, concluding: "we find the
postponed warrantless search of the defendant's shoulder bag to
be unreasonable" and "the search was not incident to the
defendant's arrest." Id., at 4a, Sa. In light of the clear
reference to the State'S waiver, I would interpret the latter
conclusions as mere dictum. This does not appear to be a case in
which the state court excused a default and rested its decision
on the merits of the claim.
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October 28, 1982

81-1859 Illinois v. LafavettB

Dear Chief:
Although my vote was a "shaky" one to join 3, I
hesitate to decide this case by a PC.
As I read your draft, it would expand our recent
automobile search cases that were based - at least for me in part on the limited expectation of privacy that one has
in an automobile. This was a part of the rationale in my
Saunders opinion.
The search of a closed container in a station
house may, as vou suggest, be justified as an "inventory
search", even though a warrant easily was obtainable. But I
had rather not go this far without having full briefing and
argument. Nor am I eaqer to add another Fourth Amendment
case for this Term. I am now inclined to deny.
Sincerely,

--:;:::::::-

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

Justice White
Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor

r!

[Levene--October 28, 1982]

2nd Draft -- Illinois v. Lafayette, No. 811859

Per Curiam:
Respondent was charged with possession
of a controlled substance in violation of Section 1402 (b) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 56 1/2,
1402 (b).

~

Prior to trial, the Kankakee County

Circuit Court suppressed the ten amphetamine
pills found in respondent's shoulder bag dur-

-

ing an inventory

~ ........................

se~ch

at the stationhouse.

The Iilinois Appellate Court affirmed the suppression order, 99 Ill. App.3d 830, 425 N.E.2d
1383 (3d Dist. 1981), and the Illinois Supreme
Court declined discretionary review.
Pet. for Cert. B-1.

'

'

App. to

We have concluded that

- 2 -

the court below erred in requiring that respondent's bag be sealed and inventoried as a
single item, and we reverse.
On September 1, 1980, at about 10 p.m.,
Officer Maurice Mietzner arrived at the Town
Cinema in Kankakee in response to a call about
~

a disturbance.

There he found the respondent

in a violent altercation with the theatre manager. Mietzner arrested respondent for disturbance of the peace, handcuffed him, and took
him to the police station.

Respondent wore
~

his shoulder bag on the trip to the station.
At the police station respondent was
taken to the booking room: there Mietzner removed the handcuffs from respondent and ordered him to empty his pockets and place the
contents on the counter.

After doing so, re-

spondent took a package of cigarettes from his

•.

-

3 -

shoulder bag and placed the bag on the

--

counter.

Mietzner then searched the bag, and

found ten amphetamine pills inside a cigarette

case package.
At the suppression hearing, Mietzner
testified that he examined the bag's contents

---------

because "everything" had to be inventoried as
"---'""'

part of the standard police procedure.

He did

not expect to find drugs or weapons when he
searched it; he conceded that the shoulder bag
was small enough that it could have been
"placed and sealed in a larger bag or box for
-------------~

protective purposes."

~

99 Ill. App.3d at 832,

425 N.E.2d at 1384.
The State argued before the trial court

-

that the search of the shoulder bag was a valid inventory search.

The trial court summari-

ly suppressed the pills.

-

4 -

On appeal, the State contended for the
first time that the search was "incident to a
lawful custodial arrest," and again claimed
that the search "constituted a valid inventorying of the defendant's personal effects
upon his arrest."

99 Ill. App.3d at 832, 425

N.E.2d at 1385.
The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed.
It held that the state had waived the argument
that the search was incident to a valid custodial arrest by failing to raise it at the suppression hearing.

Id.

The court went on to

state that "the stationhouse search of the
shoulder bag did not constitute a valid search
incident to a lawful arrest."

99 Ill. App.3d

at 833, 425 N.E.2d at 1885.
The Court of Appeals also held that the
search was not a valid inventory of respon-

- 5

dent's belongings.

It purported to distin-

guish South Dakota v. Opperman, 428

-

(1976), finding

u.s.

364

(1) that there is a greater

privacy interest in a purse-like shoulder bag

----------~-----

-----

than in a car, and (2) that the State's legitimate interests could have been met in a
less intrusive manner, by "sealing [the shoulder bag] within a platic bag or box and placing it in a secured locker."
at 834-35, 425 N.E.2d at 1386.

99 Ill. App.3d
Presumably,

that court concluded that after sealing the
bag a warrant should have been obtained.

We

disagree.
In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428

u.s.

364 (1976), we upheld a search of the contents

fully impounded by the police.
(·

We recognized

that inventory searches serve three legitimate

~-

.-

_....,~~~·

{)-

_

purpose~o

protect the owner's property

(Ej
while in the custody of the police, to protect
the police against false claims of theft, and

~

to protect the police from potential harm.
Id. at 369.

Accordingly, we held that the

Fourth Amendment does not prohibit routine
inventory searches of automobiles lawfully in
police custody.
Of course, there are limits on inventory searches, which remain subject to the
Fourth Amendment's bar on "unreasonable"
searches.

What is reasonable must be deter-

mined from all the facts and circumstances.
It would be "unreasonable" to carry out an
investigative search under the pretext of conducting a routine inventory search, United
States v. Diggs, 544 F. 2d 116, 125-27 (CA3
1976)

(Gibbons,~·,

concurring): State v.

- 7 -

Crabtree, 618 P.2d 484, 486 (Utah 1980), or to
conduct a more intrusive search than is necessary to protect the property and themselves.
Here, the police routinely inventoried
respondent's possessions after a routine arrest for disorderly conduct.

They did not

suspect they would find contraband.

Respon-

dent does not claim that the inventory was a
pretext; on the contrary, he concedes that the

7

police merely sought to protect themselves
from false claims and respondent's property
from theft or damage.
6.

Br. for Resp. in Opp.

Thus, the only question is whether the

search was more intrusive than needed.
In Opperman, we rejected the claim that
the car should have been locked and placed
under guard to protect it and its contents.
Although separately inventorying and storing

·.

-

~

-

the car's contents entailed a greater intrusion into the owner's privacy, we held such a
search permissible for three reasons.
First, searching the car was the only
way the police could

adequa~ely

protect them-

selves against the occasional danger that
unsearched cars might present.

As there is no

way that police can tell whether or what class

(

of automobiles that come into their custody
might contain dangerous instrumentalities,
only routine searches can guarantee their
safety.

Second, inventories may help to dis-

courage false claims against the police.

And

third, there is "a · substantial gain in security if automobiles are inventoiied and valuable
items are removed for storage."
U.S. at 379

~

(Powell,~.,

Opperman, 428

concurring).

The

same reasons apply here to the police decision

II
I

r ,

~ separatelyzinventory

the contents of re-

spondent's bag rather than to seal and secure
the bag as a

s~.

First, any items that are brought within the confines of a police station, however
innocent in appearance, might contain dangerous instrumentalities.

The need to protect

against such risks does not turn on the presence or absence of an actual fear that a par-

(~

c:.

ticular package is dangerous.

Second, absent

a detailed inventory, the police would still
be subject to claims that "someone" entered
the sealed locker and removed valuable items
from the bag.

Third, the very existence of an

inventory list may deter police employees from
stealing goods in police custody.

Thus, it

was not "unreasonable" for the police to in-

ventory the contents of respondent's shoulder
bag.
Respondent's reliance on United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1976), is misplaced.
In Chadwick, the FBI arrested the respondent
as he entered a car outside the Boston train
station.

At the same time, they also seized a

-

large, locked footlocker that respondent had
just placed in the car.

-

-

~
i

Unlike this case, the

( .

had abundant probable cause to believe the
footlocker contained contraband.

We held that

the subsequent warrantless search of the double locked footlocker in the Federal Building
violated the Fourth Amendment, rejecting the
government's claim that the search fell within
the "automobile" or "search incident to arrest" exceptions.

The government did not

claim that the search was a routine inventory

search, 1 and indeed could not have done so
since the purpose of the search was to confirm
strong suspicion that the footlocker contained
drugs.
We conclude that police may routinely
inventory the contents of containers in the
possession of a person lawfully arrested. 2
Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and
respondent's motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted, the judgment of the Illinois
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded to that court for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

1 Indeed, we specifically noted that our analysis did not apply
to inventory searches under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 u.s.
364 (1976). See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10 n.S
~1977).

We do not address the issue whether the police could search
the bag as a delayed search incident to respondent's arrest in
view of the holding below that the state waived this issue by
failing to raise it in the suppression hearing. See Wainright v.
Sykes, 433 u.s. 72, 86-87 (1977).
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
No. 81-1859:
Illinois v. Lafayette
Prom:

April 18, 1983

Mark

Questions Presented
Whether the police, acting pursuant to standard procedures,
may conduct a warrantless station-house search of an arrestee's
shoulder bag.

?. •

I. Background
At 10:00 p.m. resp was arrested in a movie theater in Kankakee,

Illinois,

(purse)

for disturbing the peace.

strapped over

his

shoulder.

He had a shoulner bag

The arresting officer did

not search resp or seize the purse, but handcuffed him and took
him to the police station.

In the booking room the officer re-

moved the handcuffs and told
pockets and place

resp

to

take

them on the counter.

everything from his

Resp did so.

He also

removed a pack of cigarettes from the purse and then placed the
purse on the counter.
pills wrapped

The officer opened the purse and found ten

in cellophane.

The pills contained amphetamine,

and resp subsequently was indicted for unlawful possession.
The trial court suppressed the pills seized from the purse.
The

Illinois Appellate Court, Third District,

affirmed.

.First,

the court held that the State had waived its argument that the
search was
arrest.

justified as

But

then

the

a delayed search
court

held,

incident

n.ssuming

to a

arguendo

lawful

that

the

State had not waived the argument, that the search would not be
justified as a nelayed search incident to arrest.

.Finally, the

court held that the search could not be justified as an inventory
search.

The Illinois Supreme Court denied review.

This Court granted cert following the Chief's unsuccessful
attempt to get a Court for a summary reversal.

The United States

has filed a brief in support of petr, as has the Americans for
Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.
zations).

(joined by several police organi-

The California State Public Defender has filed a brief

.._

in support of resp.

3.

II. Discussion
Petr seeks to

justify the search here as either

the

search

incident question very close,

issue is not properly before the Court.
the issue,

a de-

0: ( ii) an inventory search.

layed search incident to arrest,
find

( i)

I

but believe the

If the Court does reach

I would hold that the search incident rationale does

not extend beyond the immediate post-arrest situation to the police station.

I also believe that the search in this case is not

justified on an inventory theory.

I therefore recommend affirm-

ance.

~~

A

1.

The

whether

it

first
is

on

the

incident"

i7

before

the

The

1s court

question

properly

is

stated:

"[W]e find the State has waived this argument for the

purposes

of

hearing."

appeal by

failing

(Pet. App. at 3a.)

to

raise

it

at

the

suppression

But the Illinois court also stated

that "even assuming, arguendo, that the State had not waived this
argument,

the

stationhouse

search of the shoulder bag did not

constitute a valid search incident to a

lawful arrest."

( Id.)

And the court then conducted a detailed discussion of this issue
--

a

discussion

search" question.
this statement:

longer

than

its

discussion of

the

"inventory

The Illinois court concluded its opinion with
"Therefore, the postponed warrantless search of

the defendant's shoulder bag was neither

incident to his lawful

arrest nor a valid inventory of his belongings, and thus, violated the fourth amendment.

Accordingly, we affirm .... "

(Id., at

4.

6a-7a.}
I

think it clear that the court's "waiver" holding consti-

tutes an

i~~"a d equate

argues

that

issue,

this Court may consider it.

U.S.

because

153, 157

the

(1974}:

s a e

sta te ground of
cour

ac e

an

the

See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418

Raley v. Ohio,

In those cases, however,

Petr

360

u.s.

423, 436

the situation was that the state court

had decided an issue that arguably had not been raised:
ther case did

(1959}.

in nei-

the state court expressly hold that the argument

had been waived.

It troubles me that the state court issued an

advisory opinion on this issue, but the fact remains that if this
Court were to reverse on a

"search incident" theory, on remand

the Illinois court would be free to reinstate its judgment on the
basis of its waiver holding.
Petr
Steagald

also argues

v.

that Illinois's waiver

United States,

451

u.s.

204

rule

(1981},

that this Court may review the question whether

is based on
and

therefore

the issue was

waived.

(Petr then argues that it actually did raise the search

incident

issue

in

a

post-suppress ion

prior to the trial court's decision.}

hearing

memorandum

filed

I reject petr's position.

A state's waiver rule, even if based on a federal standard,

is

state law and is not subject to review in this Court.
2. I turn to the merits of the search incident question, for
your consideration in the event you disagree with my analysis of
the waiver

issue.

(The search

background in this area.}

The f

incident cases also are useful
ctr ine of search

inciden~ _!J

a

lawful arrest is based on the need to protect arresting officers

J

5.

from nearby weapons and to prevent the concealment or destruction

/,'
of evidence.

See b himel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

/ united States v.

Robinson,

414

U.S.

218,

235

(1973),

In

the Court

~£/L

upheld a search of a cigarette pack in the arrestee's pocket even
though the police lacked probable cause:

"A custodial arrest of

a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under
the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification."
York

v.

Belton,

453

U.S.

454

(1981),

In New

the Court reaffirmed the

rule, and noted that it permits searches of all containers within
the arrestee's immediate control.
In view of this precedent, it is clear -- and resp concedes
that the police could have searched this shoulder bag at the

(~ im~

The question then becomes whether this basis
of ~ r

for the search remains when the

reaches the station.

An

affirmative answer is provided in United States v. Edwards, 415

u.s.

800

(1974).

In that case the Court upheld a warrantless

seizure and search of an arrestee's clothing.
opinion for

the Court

(which you

joined)

JUSTICE WHITE Is

noted that the police

had authority to take the clothes into custody, and stated that
"[t] he pol ice were also entitled to take from Edwards any evidence of
clothing."

the crime
Id.,

in his

at 804-805.

the Court said flatly:

immediate possess ion,

including his

More to the point for this case,

"It is ... plain that searches and sei-

zures that could be made on the spot at the time of the arrest
may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the
place of detention."

415

u.s.,

at 803.

The rationale was that

l

..A
.,. l

_AAJ w- .. ~~~(~
stL.:5vv ~ ~l''::!~
.
~

fJ ~ w

fY

J . ;:----

'

the accused "was no mo e imposed upon than he couln have been at

1.9...,

the time and place of t

~theory,

Under

purse was lawful.

th~he
er,

a

it would seem that the search of resp's

The police did no more than they could have at
arrest.

by United States v.

validated

at 805.

warrantless

double-locked footlocker.

An opposite result is suggested, howevChaowick,
search,

433
at

u.s.

the

1

(1977),

police

whi\'h

station,

The Chief's opinion (which you i

distinguished the "search incident" cases in language that
appear to apply fully to this case:
"[W] arrantless searches of luggage or other
property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be iustified as incident to that arrest
either if the 'search is remote in time or
place from the a'rre'sl:,'
or no exigency
exists.
Once law enforcement officers have
reduceo luggage or other personal property not
i~mediately ass~ciated w~h the person of the
arrestee to the1r exclusive control, and there
is no longer any aanger tha£ the arrestee
might gain access to the property to seize a
weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that
property is no longer an incident of the arn~st."
433 u.s., at 15.
Under this approach, it is not true that the police may do at the
stationhouse whatever they might have 0.one at the scene; rather,
once the particular

interests that

justify a search incident to

arrest have vanished, a warrant (or some other rationale)

is nee-

essary for the search.
The

€

and Edwards.

~__E!..s ..!£ rec~nc§

these passages from Chadwick

He relies on a distinction derived from the Chief's

use of the phrase "luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee."

Under this

theory, he suggests that the search incident rationale continues

'

'

.

7.
beyond the immediate post-arrest situation whenever the item is
something

or~inarily

kept within

"carried on the person of an individual or

ready access

There is some

at

all times."

Brief

for

intuitive force to this position:

SG at 17.

a purse seems

more like a person's pockets (which surely can be searched at the
~

pol ice

stat ion)

(which cannot

than 1 ike
be

a

searched) .

Clouble-lockec1

2 00-pouna

But adherence

to

this

footlocker
view would

produce the same problems associated with the "unworthy container"

test

in

the car search cases.

If a purse is

"immediately

associated with the person," is the same true of a suitcase that
he is carrying?
shopping bags?

What about a briefcase?
In short,

a shopping bag?

four

the 1 ine-dr awing problems would be as

difficult -- and as confusing to police -- as those in the car
search cases.

Having

iust decided to avoid

these problems by

adopting a bright-line test in United States v. Ross, - -u.s. - (1982), the Court probably shouln do so in this context as well.
I therefore think that, if the search incident issue proper- ~
ly were here, the Court would have to choose between the
and Chadwick rationales.

Edwards ~

Following Edwards, the Court could

. t.d-'

hol~

dL

that the police are entitled to conduct a stationhouse search to

the same extent as they are entitled to conduct a contemporaneo ~

__.

-

search incident to arrest.

Following Chadwick,

the Court could

hold that the primary basis of a search incident to arrest -- the
exigencies of the situation -- has c1isappearec1 by the time the
arrestee

and

his

belongings arrive at

the police station,

and

therefore any search conducted there must be pursuant to a warrant or

justified by a different rationale.

I do not find this

'•

8.

an easy choice, because I believe there is some force in Edwards'
reasoning that if the police could search the shoulder bag at the
scene, there is little reason to find that the police cannot conduct

the

same search at the station.

But I conclude that the
~

rationale of a contemporaneous search incident to arrest simply
does not apply to a stationhouse search of a purse.
the police

reach

the stationhouse,

By the time

the purse should be

suffi-

ciently secured so that the suspect cannot reach it to obtain a
weapon or to destroy or conceal evidence.

(In fact, this was not

true here, but I would think that by permitting the arrestee to
retain the shoulder bag on the trip to the station, the officer
indicated his belief that there was no danger to himself or to
possible evidence.)
like

a

The search at the station, therefore, is not

contemporaneous

search

incident

to

search may be conducted "incident to booking"

arrest.

Whatever

Rhould be deter-

mined by reference to the particular interests of the police in
security at the station.

~

~

B

1. The issue that is before the

searc"'l
The leading case

below is valid as a r utine inventory
is South Dakota v.

Opperman,

428

u.s.

364

(1976),

in which the

Court upheld a routine inventory search of a lawfully impounded
automobile.

The Court's opinion placed partial emphasis on the

fact that a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a car.
It also noted that the police were operating pursuant to a standard procedure that served three interests:

,.

(i) protection of the

~

~

9.
owner's property,

(ii)

protection of the police from claims con-

cerning lost or stolen property, anQ (iii) protection of the police

from potential danger.

428 U.S.,

at 369.

The Court held

that these routine administrative searches did not require a warrant,

for

the concept of probable cause did not apply to these

noninvestigative searches.
You joined the Chief's opinion, but also wrote a concurring
opinion stating

that

the decision "provides no general license

for the police to examine all the contents of such automobiles."
Id., at 380.

You emphasized that the police operated pursuant to

departmental regulations and without discretion; that the police
had not searched the locked trunk, and that there was no evidence
in the record that the police had examined the contents of the
items seized other than so far as necessary to inventory them and
~

remove them for storage.
2. The application of Opperman to this case is not

simple. ~

To the extent Opperman turned on the reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile -- particularly in an abandoned automobile
-- the decision does not apply to a stationhouse search of the
contents of a purse or other container.

On the other hand,

the

rationales of Opperman are not limited to the car situation.

It

~

therefore is necessary to consider how they apply here:

ro_teet io~

e
seems

to provine

0

f

little

piece of property found
could

be

the own::,' S pr o'?._e r ty -- ThiS rationale
reason

to

search

and

in an arrestee's purse.

locked up in one piece,

inventory

The entire bag

without being open eo,

would be as safe as if the bag were searched,

every

and

it

inventoried, ann

~f.tt..

10.
then locked up.
(ii)

Protection of police from false claims -- As vou sug-

gested in Opperman,

this rationale has

limite~

force.

It proba-

bly is true that a detailed inventory will minimize false claims,
but it is possible that some owners will assert that property was
omitted from the inventory.
(iii)
rationale
cases,

Protection of police from nanger -- In my view, your
in

Opperman

there

is

applies

1 i ttle

unsearched automobiles.

equally

danger

here:

"Except

associ a ted

with

in

rare

impouncHng

But the occasional danger that may exist

cannot be discounted entirely.

The harmful consequences in those

rare cases may be great, and there does not appear to be any effective

way

of

identifying

classes

of

automobile

risk."

428

u.s.,

in

advance

impoundments

at 378.

those

which

circumstances

represent

a

or

greater

For example, there may be some danger

to police when, upon the person's release from jail, they return
an unsearched purse that might contain a weapon.
It therefore appears that the

justifications for an inven-

tory search do extend to the police station.
privacy interests, however,

The countervailing

seem greater than in Opperman:

the

expectation of privacy in personal effects is greater than in an
abandoned
such

automobile.

search

be 1 imi ted

Under this rationale,
dures"

You

followed

were

concerned,

moreover,

and conducted pursuant

to

that

any

regulations.

it is not clear that the "standard proce-

in the Kankakee police station are sufficiently

delineated or routine.

The arresting officer testified that when

he arrests a person with a purse, he routinely examines the con-

""S

c

11.
tents.

He also said that he

looke~

thing has to be inventoried."

in the purse because "every-

App. 15.

But there was no testi-

mony that the Kankakee police department haa any regulations to
this effect or that it otherwise instructed the officer on how to
proceed.
lice

For example, we are not informed as to whether the po-

routinely open an<'!

with the arrestee.
inventory
inside

in

Nor are we tolo when an officer decides his

sufficiently detailed -- for

zippered compartment

floes

he go

does he open any

container found in the zippered compartment?

does he open any-

found

in

example,

the purse?

thing

a

is

inventory locked containers brought

in the container?

In sum,

the officer 1 s testimony

that "a search at the time of booking" is "a normal proceflure" is
not particularly helpful.
It seems fair

App. 12.

to conclude that the Kankakee police search

everything on the arrestee 1 s

possession.

I

do not believe the

Court should adopt a broad rule permitting the police to inventory

everything

lawfully

in

their

custody.

search is permissible in all situations,

If

an

inventory

then the Fourth Amena-

ment effectively does not apply once a person is arrested.
would undercut much prior case law.

u.s.

This

In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442

753 (1979), for example, the Court invalidated a warrantless

search of

an

unlocked

sui tease.

Under

the

broadest

inventory

theory, the police could inventory the suitcase once at the station.

Indeed,

examine and

under a broad inventory theory,

the police could

inventory the contents of the locked trunk at issue

in Chadwick.
If the police cannot inventory every piece of property that

12.
/

comes into the station, the difficult question arises again as to
where to draw the line.

It appears to me that the effect of for- (

bidding an inventory search in all cases is to forbid it in al- \
most

~case.

If an inventory search is not permissible for an

unlocked suitcase (as was involved in

San~ers)

, there would be no

justification for permitting it with respect to resp's unlocked
"shoulder bag."

The exception would he that the police of course

may seize and inventory all items from the arrestee's person and
clothing.

This is essential for security if the person is to be

detained at the station.
seizure of these items.
like

the sui tease

But this rationale would support only
Once seized, any such property would be

in Sanders or

the

luggage

in Chadwick:

the

police have lawful custody of it, but may not search it without a
warrant.
3. The SG adds an additional consideration.

When an arrest-

ee is taken into custody, it is reasonable for the police to determine his identification.

Suppose he refuses to identify him-

self or gives a name the police think may be false, or the police
simply want his driver's license to aid their booking.

Are they

prohibited

that may

from

opening

his purse or other container

contain such identification?

Must they allow the arrestee him-

self to extract from the closed container the relevant pieces of
identification, without first making sure that the container has
no weapon that may be used against them?

I am sympathetic to the

SG's point that "it is entirely reasonable, as part of the administrative

booking

procedure,

arrestee's wallet or purse

•''

to

inspect

the

contents

of

an

in order to ascertain or verify the

13.
identity of the person being incarcerated."

Brief for SG at 19.

The booking procedure should not become complex or in any sense a
"game" in which the officers try to discover the identity of the
arrestee.
If the Court held that the police could search a wallet or
purse

for

main.

identification,

some

line-drawing

This case is a good example.

problems would

re-

Resp describes the searched

item as a "shoulder bag" that resembles luggage: petr describes
it as

a

"purse"

(The record

that

is

functionally

equivalent

is not developed on this point,

to

a

wallet.

though my guess is
It therefore is

that it is more like a purse than a suitcase.)

not clear if the police would have had cause to look for identification in this bag.
Because the State 0id not raise this issue, but rather has
sought to defend only on the need to inventory the items in the
purse, the Court need not reach the question of looking for identification.

I

have raised the point because I

think it is one

that should be considered when one is trying to figure out exactly

what

the

police

should

be

entitled

to do when

booking

an

arrestee.
4.
herein,

I

am not entirely comfortable with

for

I

the

result

reached

think that rejection of petr 's argument may well

result in a major change in police practice.

The brief for the

law enforcement amici points out that Professor LaFave's treatise
states:
"Currently, such evidence [resulting from
tine booking searches] is admissible, and
is generally so even when the inventory
been most thorough.
It is customary for

routhis
has
the

14.
booking inventory to involve an i tem-by-i tern
examination of everything in the arrestee 1 s
pockets or otherwise on his person, including
looking into his wallet or into containers on
the perso ~ even extend to a strip
search."
2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure,
§5.3 (1978).

And in previous cases the Court has found historical practice to
be

For example,

relevant.

in Edwards JUSTICE WHITE observec'l:

"Historical evidence points to the established and routine custom
of permitting a iailor to search a person who is being

processe~

for confinement under his custody and control.

1

While

[a] rule

of practice must not be allowed ••• to prevail over a constitutional

right,

1

little doubt has ever been expressed about the

validity or reasonableness of such searches incident to incarceration."

415 U• S • , at 8 0 4 n • 6 ( c i tat ions om i t ted) •

Nonetheless,

I do not think that the rationales in Opperman should permit a

{

warrantless search of every piece of property lawfully seized by
the police.

I I I. Conclusion
I recommend affirmance on the ground that the police may not
routinely search and inventory every piece of property that the
arrestee brings with him to the police station.

Other possible

justifications for the search are not before the Court.

The "de-

layed search incident" argument was waived, and the State has not
sought to defend the search of the purse as necessary to obtain
identification.
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JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

..

Re:

81-1859 - Illinois v. Lafayette

Dear Chief,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
cpm

.Ju.prtmt <lfourt qf tlft ~tb .ftms

...ufrington. ~. <If. 2llgtll-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 1, 1983
Re:

No. 81-1859

Illinois v. Lafayette

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

~uputtt.r

<!fllltti llf tlft 'J!tnit.tb ;§taft.&'

:.lnl'ltittgton. ~. <!f. 206!)!.~
CHAMB E RS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 6, 1983

Re:

81-1859 - Illinois v. Lafayette

Dear Chief:
As I read the holding on page 9 of your opinion,
it would apply to a case in which a person was stopped
for a traffic offense and was taken to the station to
be booked because he was not carrying his driver's
license.
I wonder if you intend the holding to apply
to every booking, or merely to those that precede the
actual incarceration of the arrested person.
Perhaps it is necessary to write the opinion that
broadly because it is probably somewhat doubtful that
this respondent would have actually been kept in jail
on a disturbing the peace charge but, at least for the
moment, I am inclined to think the opinion is somewhat
broader than I will be able to join.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.§upuuu
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CHAMBERS Of"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 6, 1983

Re:

81-1859 - Illinois v. Lafayette

Dear Chief:
As I read the holding on page 9 of your opinion,
it would apply to a case in which a person was stopped
for a traffic offense and was taken to the station to
be booked because he was not carrying his driver's
license.
I wonder if you intend the holding to apply
to every booking, or merely to those that precede the
actual incarceration of the arrested person.
Perhaps it is necessary to write the opinion that
broadly because it is probably somewhat doubtful that
this respondent would have actually been kept in jail
on a disturbing the peace charge but, at least for the
moment, I am inclined to think the opinion is somewhat
broader than I will be able to join.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.§n.prtmt CI;.ourt of t~t 1tnitth .§taft,s'

'21Ia.."ftington, ~· <q.
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CHA M BERS OF

.JU ST I CE SA N D RA DAY O'C ONNOR

June 7, 1983

No.

81-1859

Illinois v.

Dear Chief,
It was my understanding from the Conference that a
majority thought the State had waived the search incident to
an arrest argument and that we would decide the case on the
inventory search basis.
I was surprised to see the reliance
on the search incident to arrest cases on pp. 4-5 inasmuch
as the opinion appears to finally be based on an inventory
search.
I am not yet reconciled to an abandonment of the
approach Potter had taken of requiring a warrant unless the
search falls within a recognized exception. Having been a
trial judge, and having conducted many judges training
programs, I can tell you firsthand that most judges
understand the "warrant exception" approach better than an
approach based solely on a "reasonable search" basis.
I
prefer to move very cautiously away from our precedents in
this area.
I suggest that the first full paragraph of Part II
on pp. 3 & 4 be revised to read substantially as follows:
"The question here is whether,
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the police
may search the personal effects of a person under
lawful arrest as part of the routine
administrative procedure at a police stationhouse
incident to booking and jailing the suspect. The
justification for such searches does not rest on
the existence of probable cause.
Indeed, we have
previously established that the inventory search
constitutes a well-defined exception to the
warrant requir e ment. See South Dakota v.
Opperman, supra.
The Illinois court and
respondent rely on United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753 (1979); in the former, we noted that 'probable

·-

2.

cause to search is irrelevant' in inventory
searches and went on to state:
'This is so because the
salutary functions of a warrant simply
have no application in that context; the
constitutional reasonableness of
inventory searches must be determined on
other bases.'
Id., at 10 n.S.lJ
To determine whether the search of respondent's
shoulder bag was unreasonable we must 'balance[e]
its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.' Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 654 (1979); cf. South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S., at 367-369 (referring to
individual's diminished expectation of privacy in
automobile and legitimate state interests served
by inventory); id., at 378-380, 382-384 (POWELL,
J., concurring)~
Finally, I think we should adhere to the Opperman
requirement that inventory searches be conducted in
accordance with established administrative rules or
procedures.
Perhaps you could add a footnote following the
first sentence on page 8 as follows:
"[I]t is not our function to write a manual on
administering routine, neutral procedures at the
sta tionhouse .lJ

lJ

We do emphasize, however, that it must appear that
the search in question was "conducted in accordance
with established police department rules or policy" and
that the search was part of the routine administrative
procedure, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S., at 383
(POWELL, J., concurring), if the authorities attempt to
justify the stationhouse search as an inventory
search."
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
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2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-1859

ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. RALPH LAFAYETTE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF
ILLINOIS, THIRD DISTRICT
[June-, 1983]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The question presented is whether, at the time an arrested
person arrives at a police station, the police may, without obtaining a warrant, search a shoulder bag carried by that
person.
I
On September 1, 1980, at about 10 p.m., Officer Maurice
Mietzner of the Kankakee City Police arrived at the Town
Cinema 111 Kankakee, Illinois, in response to a call about a
disturbance. There he found respondent involved in an
altercation with the theatre manager. He arrested respondent for disturbing the peace, handcuffed him, and took him to
the police station. Respondent carried a purse-type shoulder bag on the trip to the station.
At the police station respondent was taken to the booking
room; there, Officer Mietzner removed the handcuffs from respondent and ordered him to empty his pockets and place the
contents on the counter. After doing so, respondent took a
package of cigarettes from his shoulder bag and placed the
bag on the counter. Mietzner then removed the contents of
the bag, and found ten amphetamine pills inside a cigarette
case package.
{f>"-''.i ~Si!M
Respondent was subsequently charged with violating Sec-

81-1859---0PINION
2

ILLINOIS v. LAFAYETTE

tion 1402(b) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, Ill.
Rev. Stat., ch. 56 112, ~ 1402(b), on the basis of the controlled
substances found in his shoulder bag. A pretrial suppression
hearing was held at which the State argued that the search of
the shoulder bag was a valid inventory search under South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976).
Officer
Mietzner testified that he examined the bag's contents because it was standard procedure to inventory "everything" in
the possession of an arrested person. App. 15, 16. He testified that he was not seeking and did not expect to find drugs
or weapons when he searched the bag and he conceded that
the shoulder bag was small enough that it could have been
placed and sealed in a bag, container or locker for protective
purposes. !d., at 15. After the hearing, but before any ruling, the State submitted a brief in which it argued for the
first time that the search was valid as a delayed search incident to arrest. Thereafter, the trial court ordered the suppression of the amphetamine pills. I d., at 22.
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. 99 Ill.
App. 3d 830, 425 N. E. 2d 1383 (3d Dist. 1981). It first held
that the State had waived the argument that the search was
incident to a valid arrest by failing to raise that argument at
the suppression hearing. !d., at 832, 425 N. E. 2d, at 1385.
However, the court went on to discuss and reject the State's
argument: "[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that the State has
not waived this argument, the stationhouse search of the
shoulder bag did not constitute a valid search incident to a
lawful arrest." !d., at 833, 425 N. E. 2d, at 1385.
The State court also held that the search was not a valid
inventory of respondent's belongings. It purported to distinguish South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, on the basis that
there is a greater privacy intere t in a purse-type shoulder
bag than in an automobile, and that the State's legitmate interests could have been met in a less intrusive manner, by
"sealing [the shoulder bag] within a plastic bag or box and
placing it in a secured locker." 99 Ill. App. 3d, at 834-835,
425 N. E. 2d, at 1386. The Illinois court concluded:
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"Therefore, the postponed warantless search of the [respondent's] shoulder bag was neither incident to his lawful arrest nor a valid inventory of his belongings, and
thus, violated the fourth amendment." !d., at 835, 425
N. E. 2d, at 1386.
The Illinois Supreme Court denied discretionary review.
App. to Pet. for Cert. B-1. We granted certiorari, - U. S. - - (1982), because of the frequency with which this
question confronts police and courts, and we reverse.
II

The question here is whether, consistent with the Fourth \
Amendment, it is reasonable for police to search the personal
effects of a person under lawful arrest as part of the routine
administrative procedure at a police stationhouse incident to
booking and jailing the suspect. The justification for such
searches does not rest on probable cause, and hence the absence of a warrant is immaterial to the reasonableness of the
search. Indeed, we have previously established that the inventory search constitutes a well-defined exception to the
warrant requirement. See South Dakota v. Opperman,
supra. The Illinois court and respondent rely on United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977), and Arkansa v.
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979); in the former, we noted that
"probable cause to search is irrelevant" in inventory searches
and went on to state:
"This is so because the salutary functions of a warrant
simply have no application in that context; the constitutional reasonableness of inventory searches must be determined on other bases." I d., at 10 n. 5. 1
'See also United States v. Edwm·ds, 415 U. S. 800 (1974). In that case
we addressed Cooper v. Cal(f'omia, 386 U. S. 58 (1967), where the Court
sustained a warrantless search of an automobile that occurred a week after
its owner had been arrested. We explained Coope1· in the following manner: "It was no answer to say that the police could have obtained a search
warrant, for the Court held the test to be, not whether it was reasonable to
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A so-called inventory search is not an independent legal concept but rather an incidental administrative step following arrest and preceding incarceration. To determine whether the \
search of respondent's shoulder bag was unreasonable we
must "balanc[e] its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. 8.
648, 654 (1979).
In order to see an inventory search in proper perspective,
it is necessary to study the evolution of interests along the
continuum from arrest to incarceration. We have held that
immediately upon arrest an officer may lawfully search the
person of an arrestee , United States v. Robinson, 414 U. 8.
218 (1973); he may also search the area within the arestee's
immediate control, Chim el v. California, 395 U. 8. 752
(1969). We explained the basis for this doctrine in United
States v. Robinson, supra, where we said:
"A police officer's determination as to how and where to
search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is
necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth
Amendment does not require to be broken down in each
instance into an analysis of each step in the search. The
authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to
discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may
later decide was the probability in a particular arrest
situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be
found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion
being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no
additional justification. It is th e fact of the lawf ul arrest
procure a search warrant , but wheth er the search itse!f'H•as reasonable,
which it was ." United States v. Edwards, supm, 415 U. S., at 807 (emphasis added).

l
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which establishes the authority to search, and we hold
that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search
of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment." 414 U. S., at
235 (emphasis added).
/~,'S$IOY\
An arrested person is not invariably taken to a police station or confined; if an arrestee is taken to the police station,
that is no more than a continuation of the custody inherent in
the arrest status. Nonetheless, the factors justifying a
search of the person and personal effects of an arrestee upon
reaching a police station but prior to being placed in confinement are somewhat different from the factors justifying an
immediate search at the time and place of arrest.
The governmental interests underlying a stationhouse
search of the arrestee's person and possessions may in some
circumstances be even greater than those supporting a
search immediately following arrest. Consequently, the
scope of a stationhouse search will often vary from that made
at the time of arrest. Police conduct that would be impractical or unreasonable-or embarrasingly intrusive-on the
street can more readily-and privately-be performed at the
station. For example, the interests supporting a search incident to arrest would hardly justify disrobing an arrestee on
the street, but the practical necessities of routine jail administration may even justify taking a prisoner's clothes before
confining him, although that step would be rare. This was
made clear in United States v. Edwards, supra, 415 U. S., at
804: "With or without probable cause, the authorities were
entitled [at the stationhouse] not only to search [the arrestee's] clothing but also to take it from him and keep it in official custody." 2
' We were not addressing in Edww·ds, and do not discuss here, the circumstances in which a strip search of an arrestee may or may not be
appropriate.
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At the stationhouse, it is entirely proper for police to remove and list or inventory property found on the person or in
the possession of an arrested person who is to be jailed. A
range of governmental interests support an inventory process. It is not unheard of for persons employed in police activities to steal property taken from arrested persons; similarly, arrested persons have been known to make false claims
regarding what was taken from their possession at the
stationhouse. A standardized procedure for making a list or /
inventory as soon as reasonable after reaching the
stationhouse not only deters false claims but also inhibits
theft or careless handling of articles taken from the arrested
person. Arrested persons have also been known to injure
themselves-or others-with belts, knives, drugs or other
items on their person while being detained. Dangerous instrumentalities-such as razor blades, bombs, or weaponscan be concealed in innocent-looking articles taken from the
arrestee's possession. The bare recital of these mundane realities justifies reasonable measures by police to limit these
risks-either while the items are in police possession or at
the time they are returned to the arrestee upon his release.
Examining all the items removed from the arrestee's person
or possession and listing or inventorying them is an entirely
It is immaterial
reaonable administrative procedure.
whether the police actually fear any particular package or
container; the need to protect against such risks arises independent of a particular officer's subjective concerns. See
United States v. Robinson, supra, 414 U. S., at 235. Finally, inspection of an arrestee's personal property may assist the police in ascertaining or verifying his identity. See 2
W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.3, at 306--307 (1978). In
short, every consideration of orderly police administration
benefiting both police and the public points toward the appropriateness of the examination of respondent's shoulder bag
prior to his incarceration.

t
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Our prior cases amply support this conclusion. In South
Dakota v. Opperman, supra, we upheld a search of the contents of the glove compartment of an abandoned automobile
lawfully impounded by the police. We held that the search
was reasonable because it served legitimate governmental interests that outweighed the individual's privacy interests in
the contents of his car. Those measures protected the owner's property while it was in the custody of the police and protected police against possible false claims of theft. We found
no need to consider the existence of less intrusive means of
protecting the police and the property in their custody-such
as locking the car and impounding it in safe storage under
guard. Similarly, standardized inventory procedures are
appropriate to serve legitimate governmental interests at
stake here.
The Illinois court held that the search of respondent's
shoulder bag was unreasonable because "preservation of the
defendant's property and protection of police from claims of
lost or stolen property 'could have been achieved in a less intrusive manner.' For example, ... the defendant's shoulder
bag could easily have been secured by sealing it within a plastic bag or box and placing it in a locker." 99 Ill. App. 3d, at
835, 425 N. E. 2d, at 1386 (citation omitted). Perhaps so,
but the real question is not what "could have been achieved,"
but whether the Fourth Amendment requires such steps; it is
not our function to write a manual on administering routine,
neutral procedures of the stationhouse. Our role is to assure
against violations of the Constitution.
The reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of
alternative "less intrusive" means. In Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U. S. 433 (1973), for example, we upheld the search of
the trunk of a car to find a revolver suspected of being there.
We rejected the contention that the public could equally well
have been protected by the posting of a guard over the auto-

I
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mobile. In language equally applicable to this case, we held,
"[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means does
not, by itself, render the search unreasonable." I d., at 44 7.
See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543,
557 n. 12 (1976). We are hardly in a position to second-guess
police departments as to what practical administrative
method will best deter theft by and false claims against its
employees and preserve the security of the stationhouse. It
is evident that a stationhouse search of every item carried on
or by a person who has lawfully been taken into custody by
the police will amply serve the important and legitimate governmental interests involved.
Even if less intrusive means existed of protecting some
particular types of property, it would be unreasonable to expect police officers in the everyday course of business to
make fine and subtle distinctions in deciding which containers
or items may be searched and which must be sealed as a unit.
Only recently in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981),
we stated: "'[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide
police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to
reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.'" I d., at
458-460, quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200,
213-214 (1979). See also United States v. Ross, 456 U. S.
798, 821 (1982).
Applying these principles, we hold that it is not "unreasonable" for police, as part of the routine procedure incident to
incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or
article in his possession, in accordance with established inventory procedures. 3
The judgment of the Illinois Appellate Court is reversed
"The record is unclear as to whether respondent was to have been incarcerated after being booked for disturbing the peace. That is an appropriate inquiry on remancl.
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and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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